Principal-Agent Problem, Fiscal Strategy, and Buddhism in the Southern Song Dynasty

Katrina Q. Wang, University of Wisconsin-Madison

How does the principal-agent problem drive the commodification of Buddhism in ancient China? In this article, I posit that the autonomy and private gains of agents can contribute to improving the principal's conditions. During the Jianyan era (1127–1130) of the Southern Song Dynasty, the concept of "Du Die" (monastic identification documents, hereafter: ID) inherited from previous generations was incorporated into the monastic management system. Amidst the turmoil of warfare and increased military demands following the royal court's crossing of the Yangtze River, the necessity for funds surged, leading to the commodification of IDs. The significance and value of IDs transcended their original function as mere identity proofs. During the Jianyan years, a system for selling IDs emerged, characterized by three key features: Firstly, Buddhism was utilized as a facade for fiscal collection. ID issuance varied in response to military, social, and state subsidy needs, effectively transforming them into a form of taxation. Secondly, while the central government (principal) ostensibly oversaw ID distribution, local authorities (agents) wielded practical discretion. Lastly, local officials (agents) enjoyed a degree of autonomy in buying and selling IDs for personal gain. Thus, the ID selling system evolved from a Buddhist monastic management tool to a significant revenue-generating mechanism for the government.

No extended abstract or paper available

 Presented in Session 185. States, Authority, and Institutional Transformation in the Religious Field