Stabilize or Socialize? Associational Policy Forms and State Responsibility for Hurricane Risk in Florida

Andrew Swift, University of Chicago

Rising catastrophe risk is destabilizing private insurance markets in the United States, as private insurers raise premiums and withdraw from particularly risky regions. In the face of private withdrawal, policymakers face the question: to what extent, and how, should state governments get involved “in the insurance business” to correct this market failure? This paper examines this question in Florida, focusing on how policymakers have negotiated the boundaries between the state and insurance market in response to intensifying environmental disruptions. Since Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the Florida state government has assumed a central role in the insurance market, filling coverage gaps left by retreating insurers and offering indirect subsidies to the private market. I examine the institutional roots of this system during the formation of public insurance programs in the early 1990s, asking, how did state actors conceptualize the organizational boundaries of the state as the scope of state involvement in the insurance market fluctuated? My analysis draws on on archival records from organizational actors within Florida state government as well as qualitative interviews with key regulators.

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 Presented in Session 1. Welfare, States, and Security