Utility Sector Structure as a Poorly Understood Factor in U.S. State-Level Renewable Energy Policy Design

Joshua Basseches, Tulane University

A large literature has developed to explain patterns in U.S. state-level climate and renewable energy policymaking. Partisanship and energy economy have emerged as two state-level variables that are especially important in explaining such patterns. This paper argues that, while both of these factors are indeed important in explaining policy adoption, a less well-understood factor – the structure of the electric utility sector – is equally important in explaining variation in policy design. Using longitudinal case studies of renewable portfolio standards (RPS) policy development in Oregon, South Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Texas, I tease apart the relative roles of all three factors in informing policy design. I draw on legislative and regulatory texts, 13,137 pages of archival material and 138 policy-focused interviews with state legislators, state executive branch policymakers, and lobbyists, to illustrate the processes and mechanisms informing policy design choices in these five states. I show that partisanship best explains why Oregon’s RPS policy was mandatory whereas South Carolina’s was only voluntary; that energy economy best explains why Oklahoma’s policy was only voluntary; and that a fully restructured electric utility sector best explains why Texas and Pennsylvania were both able to adopt moderately stringent RPS policies despite being major fossil fuel producing, Republican-dominated states. My findings have implications for understanding the policy preferences and political power of business actors in climate and renewable energy policymaking, and in particular, for understanding the policy preferences of investor-owned electric utilities.

No extended abstract or paper available

 Presented in Session 30. Natural Resource Economies