Contesting Dispossession: Eviction Surges, Protest Cycles, and Movement Divergence in India's Housing Justice Movements

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In the late 1970s, the demolition of low-income, seemingly informal neighborhoods became more widespread and more severe in many Indian cities. While "slum clearance" had long been official municipal policy in India, a favored way to address a range of planning and public health challenges, these actions took on a more punitive character during the Emergency era (1975-1977). In response, a robust cross-city network of anti-eviction groups came together late-1970s and 1980s and grew active in many Indian cities, including Delhi, Mumbai, and Bengaluru. In the nearly 50 years since, these politics have shifted and while many cities continue to have robust (if embattled) groups working to expand urbanites' right to shelter, they have become more diffuse and disconnected. While the differentiation of India's local housing and urban justice movements is not in itself a problem, activists today cite this fragmentation as a barrier to coalition building and contesting larger cross-city demolition campaigns. Tracing the divergence of urban India's housing justice movements, this paper locates their common origins in Delhi, Mumbai, and Bengaluru in the post-Emergency era of civil liberty and democratic rights organizing. Highlighting periods of heightened movement activity and eviction surges across subsequent protest cycles in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, the analysis attributes the localization of India's housing justice movements to two of the most significant political developments of this period: the rise of Hindutva and other ethno-nationalist movements, and the neoliberalization urban politics, which has made private developers and often distant real estate investors, rather than state actors and democratic institutions the target of movement activity. Citing these broader national and global shifts to explain local movement convergence and divergence, these findings and the historical and comparative approaches from which they were derived can be helpful for developing deeper understandings of local politics and movement activism.

Introduction

"…go ahead and demolish…[Bangalore's infrastructure] is considerably inadequate in comparison with the leading cities of the world."
– Karnataka's Chief Minister S.M. Krishna, August 2002

"Many people will be inconvenienced and will have to make sacrifices if the city is to develop"
– Maharashtra's Chief Minister Vilasrao Deshmukh, February 2005

"The ambition is to create a world class city...This clearance had to be done, and it has been done." – Delhi's Chief Minister Sheila Dikshit, October 2006

Since the early 2000s, local governments across India have carried out large-scale demolitions in informal settlements and "slum" communities, evicting hundreds of thousands of marginalized urban residents. These evictions have taken distinct forms across urban India, but these actions are at least discursively linked through common language used by local governments and promoted by management consulting agencies like McKinsey & Company to justify the actions. We saw this language spread throughout urban India in the first decade of the 2000s… first from Bengaluru (then Bangalore).

Justified by each of these governments as necessary to transform their major cities into "world class cities," these evictions have had a somewhat distinct character in different places, but they have all appeared to be part of common or at least linked phenomenon that extends far outside of India into the favelas of Brazil, low income communities in China, and shack settlements across the Africa continent. These evictions have been characterized in academic and popular accounts as part of a global land grab that has become prevalent under contemporary global capitalism. These evictions have been cited as examples of Accumulation by Dispossession (Harvey) or Expulsions (Sassen), by which the poor are dispossessed of their resources, in this case land and shelter, as developers and the state (working in close alignment) have financialized these resources in order to facilitate capital accumulation.

My effort in this paper, however, is to both historicize and localize this account. Although it is a compelling narrative in many ways, it fails to account for the long duree of housing insecurity that the urban poor has experienced throughout the world and particularly in India. It does little to help us understand how this current moment of housing insecurity is both a continuation and a break from earlier episodes of evictions that occurred under earlier capitalist

configurations. It also fails to account for local specificity and the geographical unevenness of this strategy, as not all places have equally experienced the financialization of urban land in this way. Moreover, and most consequential for this paper, it fails to account for the locally specific ways that urban residents and movement actors are contesting these actions.

Legal Activism – found as most dominant in Delhi: evictions contested in the courts, underpinned by legal advocacy organizations. The most has been written about this form, in important political and legal anthropological accounts by Asher Ghertner and Gautam Bhan.

Protest Politics – discernable most clearly in Mumbai: evictions contested through mass protest, media events, shaped by movement organizations. Political parties play a role in these actions, but in this form, opposition parties are operating more like social movement organizations than working through neighborhood politics.

Political Party Advocacy – in the cities in my study, this is the dominant form I identify in the city of Bengaluru – but it is also prominent in other cities in South India, particularly Chennai: In this case, evictions contested through political party structures, which have ties into neighborhoods. They are also supported by smaller pro-Dalit organizations

Although there are many ways we could be thinking about these cases, I am drawing from these historical and ethnographic data to ask the broader question of: Why do we see distinct forms of resistance emerging in different places? A bit more specifically, we are asking how movement characters are shaped by state action (and institutional structures), civil society responses, and key defining events?

Lit Review (Limited comparative social movement studies)

Scholars of urban social movements have drawn from Castells' (1983) seminal work – *The City and the Grassroots*, where he explores the role of social conflict or social movements in the production of urban forms and functions. Here, Castells examines five case studies to demonstrate how social movements have historically played a huge role in the transformation of cities. His case studies provide us with a rich analysis of early urban social movements and role of citizens, in different historical contexts, that paved the path for social change vis-à-vis formation of nation-states, labor movements, housing rights movements, and movements around the equal rights for racial, ethnic, and sexual minorities. While social movements enable conditions of urban change, they themselves transform and evolve based on local urban characteristics. • In this work, Castells describes his intention to explain: "how urban movements interact with urban forms and functions…" He explains: "how the movements develop; why they have different social and spatial effects; and what elements account for their internal structure and historical evolution." To do this, Castells draws primarily on a case study approach to explain how specific urban movements have emerged in particular places at particular historical junctures, from the Paris Commune, to squatter movements in Latin America, to the production of Gay social space in San Francisco's Castro's neighborhood. While his case studies provide rich ground for comparative analysis, his interest is less on distinguishing between these places and more on using these places to develop a broader theory of social change that anchors cities and citizens are the center of a historical evolution.

Uitermark et al (2012) emphasize the role of density, size and diversity in engendering certain kinds of social movements in the city that result in different dynamics of contention and control of socially deviant forces in cities and the politics of claims-making. These distinct movement characteristics also depend on the respective moral frames of justice oriented people

in a particular time and space, what Tilly (1994) calls "memory's politics" that engenders differentiated forms of movement repertoires. In other words, movement characteristics evolve overtime based on the urban and political conditions at a given location and time period (Lopez, 2018). While the analytical framework used by Castells and other scholars, discussed here, allow us to examine the role of historically situated social movements in urban and social transformations and how local urban and political conditions transform movement in the city, we see that there is a dearth of comparative literature on the questions of place distinct characteristics and outcomes of a social movement.

Molotch et al (2000), however, while comparing two U.S cities, Santa Barbara and Ventura in California that share common historical, socio-economic and ecological characteristics examine why we see distinct responses to the same events in different places. They explain how different actors and networks manufacture different kinds of political responses to the same exogenous factors in different places. Similar to my aims in this paper, Molotch and his colleagues asked we two particular places (in their case, two medium-sized towns in Southern California) responded in different ways to the same exogenous forces. They use these cases to ask: "how places achieve coherence and how that coherence reproduces itself." The study of place distinction is unique to this study, but there is a fairly small group of sociologists of cities and culture that have focused in this question, including Gerald Suttles in his 1984 AJS piece "The cumulative texture of local urban culture." Meanwhile, others including Gary Alan Fine and Japonica Brown-Saracino have also picked up this question. Similarly, Nelson (2021) , while analyzing distinct characteristics of women's rights movements in the first two waves in New York City and Chicago argues that different political responses to the same movement in two cities were a result of their distinct urban characteristics. This subnational level

or inter-city comparison of social movements is missing within the social movement studies literature in the Indian context.

Consequential to both theories of urban social movements and place distinction is the recognition that cities are shaped and reshaped by historical events and the developments over time. In particular, a key piece of Castells' theory of urban social movements is his recognition that "cities are the products of history, both of the urban forms and functions inherited from the past, and of the new urban meanings assigned to them by conflictive historical change."

Similarly, Molotch and his colleagues point out that cities are shaped by history or what he calls "rolling inertia," which they argue matter both "within the context of big events and mundane happenings." But while both frameworks recognize the importance of history, neither offers a very robust discussion of how it matters. And this is despite the provocative question that Molotch used to title his 2000 article: "History repeats itself, but how." In developing a framework for how places develop distinctive movement cultures, I also draw heavily on Tilly's notion of "accumulated experience" through "streams of contention," in which he argues that "… the outcome of one round of claim making modifies the conditions for the next round; innovation within one round becomes model or precedent for the next round; social relations established or changed within contentious encounters endure beyond them; third parties change their positions with respect to the protagonists; all participants gain experience that shapes, inhibits, or facilitates their next participation; all concerned incorporate interpretations of what happened into their own variants of collective memory; the very incentives for action or inaction shift as a consequence of accumulated experience"(Tilly, 1994: 248)

The social movement literature in India is primarily focussed on

Subnational politics in India:

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2321023015601744?casa_token=JSJMeTs882UAAAAA:4YvNFeobKFBv2jRwFLGw2jqzjD4ipcp9v4kkKsm-D4N3qSUq1Dz6IclUnU7AkR4S9IHU-lyq5u7E

Methods: Comparative Historical Approach to Social Movements

The paper is based on fieldwork in the cities of Delhi, Mumbai, and Bengaluru, conducted primarily in 2014, but continuing over the past five years. Along with historical and archival research I have conducted on national policies, legal cases, local administration, and anti-eviction activism. This paper argues that distinct strategies of anti-eviction activism can be identified across urban India. And while a mix of each strategy can be found across all cities, I highlight four ideal typical forms that have emerged as the dominant form of resistance to the world class city evictions. Our effort in this paper is to explain why one particular form has become the dominant mode of resistance in particular cities across India.

In this paper, we offer a perspective that looks at history to suggest that movements were shaped by accumulated histories of place.

- (1) Why do we need comparative work to understand comparative social movements? Comparative studies help us think across cases in different contexts Bring in cycles of protest here to demonstrate how history matters by pointing to the iterative encounters between activists and the state, and how they change over time through distinct protest cycles
- (2) Subnational comparison (in India)

- (3) Historical analysis: Cycles of protest

- (4) Roadmap for the paper
    (1) Political Evictions in the "Emergency Era"
    (2) Cycle 1: Post emergency 1980s (similar types of response)
        - Delhi - limited evictions, protest cycle
        - Bombay - extensive evictions, protest cycle
        - Bangalore - extensive evictions, protest cycle
    (3) Cycle 2: Urban Cleansing Early 1990s (divergent responses)
        - Delhi - limited evictions, limited violence, no protest cycle
        - Bombay - extensive evictions, extensive violence, protest cycle
        - Bangalore - limited evictions, extensive violence, protest cycle
    (4) Cycle 3: Economic Liberalization (divergent responses)
        - Delhi: Enviro-Aesthtic (1996-1997): extensive evictions, limited protest
        - Bombay: SRA (1995-1996): extensive evictions, extensive protest
        - Bangalore: Infrastructural (1997-1998): extensive evictions: extensive protest
    (5) Cycle 4: World Class City (distinct responses)
        - Delhi: Commonwealth Games: Court actions
        - Bombay: McKinsey Report: Protest politics
        - Bangalore: Civic Groups (BATF, Janagraha): Election politcs

In the post-emergency period the response of local activists was very similar in Delhi, Bombay, Bangalore, but also in other cities such as Madras and Calcutta. It was in the early 2000s that the anti-eviction movements were transformed and different movement strategies were deployed by local civil society organizations and activists in three cities that are the focus of this paper - Delhi, Bombay, and Bangalore. Through the 40 year period between emergency and world class city evictions, Delhi experienced three major protest cycles. First was in the post-emergency period that was mainly driven by civic and democratic rights politics. Second cycle was initiated by the courts in 1996-97 after many PILs were filed against the slums and polluting industries on which slum dwellers were dependent for employment. The third cycle, which was a spillover effect from the 1996-97 began in 2005 after a series of court orders that

resulted in commonwealth games evictions in Delhi. In the following paragraphs, we discuss each of these cycles in detail highlighting the major strategies deployed by civil society organizations and activists to counter evictions and demolitions in Delhi.

1. Political Evictions in the "Emergency" Era

[introductory paragraph about what happened during the emergency and how, in the next 5-10 years, anti-eviction activism took hold across the country]

On June 26th, 1975, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi projected an image that India, her rule, and its 'progressive measures of benefit to the common man and woman of India' were being threatened. 'Certain persons have gone to the length of inciting our armed forced to mutiny and our police to rebel… How can any Government worth its name stand by and allow the country's stability to be imperiled? The actions of the few are endangering the rights of the vast majority.' (Tarlo, 25). There was a overwhelming sense of urgency that the country was truly on the brink of total disaster, and thus The Emergency was a constitutional necessity to setting India back on her correct path. A temporary inconvenience was needed to allow India to accelerate the "march of progress" (Tarlo, 25). These themes came to characterize The Emergency's authoritative rule under PM Indira Gandhi, and in many ways, evictions still carry this legacy today. One of the many policies enacted under The Emergency was a slew of slum demolitions, especially documented (posthumously, as there was heavy censorship at the time) and intensely carried out in Delhi, but also in other places throughout the country, including Mumbai and Bangalore (Tarlo; Shah Commission). These demolitions were ordered at a time when there was enormous migration from the rural to the urban across India of people searching for opportunity and livelihood (D'Souza). This created a condition where the poor and upper classes are living more and more side by side rather than geographically segregated, and had heightened anxiety over

"urban congestion" (D'Souza).

After the independence of India, Delhi received about half a million people. Some of them were resettled in different refugee nagars/colonies at the peripheries of Delhi, others settled themselves in different parts of the city. While the poor and low-income groups settled themselves in what is commonly known as slums, the middle and upper class citizens constructed "unauthorized colonies" through private builders. Prior to the existence of the Delhi Development Authority, private builders such as Delhi Land and Finance Ltd (DLF) constructed housing for many middle and upper middle class refugees who arrived from the Punjab area of east-Pakistan. Some of the names of the colonies built by DLF before the existence of the DDA are Model Town, Great Kailash I, Greater Kailash II, Hauz Khas, Kailash Colony, South Extension among others[1]. DLF built around 22 colonies in Delhi. However, since the foundation of the Delhi Development Authority, land acquisition, and housing development became the sole responsibility of the state with no intervention from private developers. After the first master plan of Delhi was drafted and approved, the DDA began acquiring land in the villages within and around Delhi to fulfill the housing needs of different income groups in Delhi. DDA promised to give legal plots on leasehold basis to businesses, and middle- and high-income groups, and construct houses for the poor with the earned revenue. However, it failed to construct enough dwellings for low-income families of migrants who chose to settle themselves in slums in different parts of Delhi. With more migrants coming-in to Delhi in 1960s and 70s for better opportunities led to the emergence of more slums in Delhi.

It is in this backdrop that we should look at the slum eviction and anti-slum demolition movements in Delhi. These slums were sore in the eyes of authoritative planners and political

[1]https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/how-dlf-built-colonies-in-delhi-for-aspirational-partition-migrants-7872784/

leaders such as Jagamohan, and Sanjay Gandhi who was the younger son of ex-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In June 1975 Indira Gandhi declared a state of national emergency and stripped Indian citizens of their civic rights. While the emergency impacted the whole country, Delhi was the worst affected. Emergency was used as an instrument to rid Delhi of its slums. During the emergency over 7 lakh slum dwellers were evicted and moved to the fringes of Delhi (Delhi Janwadi Adhikar Manch report, 2001). Shah Commission report has acknowledged the culpability of Jagamohan and Sanjay Gandhi in the demolition-drive that took place between 1975-77. Slums near Jama Masjid, Turkman Gate, Jahangirpuri, Sultanpur Majra and Phoot Kalan among other places were cleared. Emergency impacted other cities in the states of Maharashtra, Karnataka, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. Demolition drives in these states were carried out in more or less similar fashion, as was in Delhi, with the support of the local administration. The shah commission report has very well documented cases of evictions and demolitions and the role of local government in these states. The Karnataka government in 1974, for example, passed The Public Premises (Evictions of Unauthorized occupants) Act 1974. The then Indian National Congress (INC) Chief Minister of Karnataka, D. Devaraj Urs, directed Deputy Commissioners and Police personnels to remove encroachers from the city. Similarly, the Maharashtra government in 1975 passed a legislation called The Maharashtra Vacant Lands (Prohibition of Unauthorized Occupation and Summary Eviction) Act 1975. This Act allowed the Congress Chief Minister, S.K. Wankhede, and state administration to evict and penalize the unauthorized slum dwellers.

Under Emergency policies, Mumbai's demolitions took on an inhumane nature of demolition and resettlement at sites generally worse off than the residents' original location (Weinstein). The local government took on more of the harsh Emergency policies than other

places in the country, especially because PM Indira Gandhi replaced the Maharashtra Chief Minister with her close Congress ally S.B. Chavan, who executed the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) to implement extremely draconian measures (Weinstein.) The government of Maharashtra found that existing laws would not be enough to achieve the aims of the demolitions and so new legislation was passed to aid this (Shah Commission).

These measures, however, also brought about some of the city's most prominent civil society groups to materialize: The Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights (CPDR) in 1975, the Lokshahi Haq Sanghathana in 1979, the People's Union for Civil Liberties and Democratic Rights (PUCLDR) in 1975 which later became the People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) in 1980, and many more (PUCL). From this extreme and harsh action which demolished about 12,000 huts came corresponding radical response in the form of civil society organization.

Much of the government's action undertaken under Emergency policies was justified in that there was a claim that there was "anti-government" sentiment throughout the country that needed to be quelled (Tarlo). It seems that this 'us versus them' framing from the government backfired so that the people most harshly impacted by Emergency policies interpreted this to mean it was the people versus their government, hence why many organizations formed outside the scope of political affiliation during this time. The trust in government had been broken and a new form of democracy was needed.

The story of Emergency demolitions in Bangalore differs quite greatly from that of both Delhi and Bombay. There was of course a smaller portion of the population in Bengaluru living in slums (add citation) than in Mumbai as there is today, and Bengaluru was experiencing major economic growth—76% between 1971 and 1981, the fastest in Asia at the time (Spivak). There

was also a vastly different politician that remained in power through 1979 that would define political culture in Bangalore in what can be described as perhaps subtle yet highly visible ways: Devaraj Urs. Urs was was the first non-dominant caste member to be elected chief minister of Karnataka (which then was Mysore), and focused his policies on tackling poverty and the social problems immediately linked to poverty (Srivinas and Panini). He focused on fair policies for the land reform in rural areas in a time where there was heightened national focus on the urban, implemented radical quotas and inclusions for the backward castes in government, and standards for low-income and self-determined housing for the poor and middle classes through the People's Housing Scheme (Srivinas and Panini).

Urs was one of the greatest public supporters of Indira Gandhi, often attributing almost all of his own policies to her genius publicly.

> "Voters believed that Indira Gandhi was the source of the post-1972 reforms and that Urs was merely her instrument. Urs himself had helped to create this impression, mainly because such slavish loyalty to Indira Gandhi was necessary to avoid the kind of irrational intrusions from the high command which has wrecked promising leaders and programmes in other states. The truth of the matter, however, is that Urs was principally responsible for the changes in Karnataka and - especially after 1974 - he had accomplished these things not because of Indira Gandhi but in spite of her. He had also largely protected Karnataka from the distasteful aspects of Emergency despite great pressure from the Sanjay caucus." (Manor, page number)

In 1980, Urs finally broke from Indira Gandhi, much to the surprise of the people of Karnataka who had attributed so much of the growth and prosperity of Karnataka directly to Gandhi over the past few years, and this betrayal/confusing shift caused his party to lose the 1980 election (Manor). Despite this, just four years later, Srivinas and Panini write of the great impact he had: "Urs left his indelible mark on the politics of the State. Apart from the specific policies and programmes which he pursued, he changed the political climate of Karnataka for good. He established the norm that the task of any elected government official was to work for

the betterment of the living conditions of the poor who constituted the majority" (69). His backward caste quotas also brought the poor and lower castes into the political life directly, and "provided new sources of patronage to the dominant cases and increased the dependency of the poor on their political patrons" (Srivinas and Panini Page #). His political legacy remains in contemporary times, as in 2006 T.P. Ramesh, president of the Kodagu District Backward, Dalits, and Minorities Federation credited him with ushering in a "silent social revolution" for the poor (The Hindu).

While Delhi and Mumbai experienced some of the most violent impacts of Emergency-era abuses, Bengaluru was largely (though not entirely) protected from the worst of it because of the tactful interventions of CM Urs, and instead has a public memory of prosperity at the time. There were certainly problems, but they were mediated through a government which wasn't necessarily by the poor, but was certainly obligated to serve it as one of its main priorities. This sets the stage for the nature and history not only of demolition and eviction, but also of the tactics used by activists and residents to respond and negotiate their rights in these three cities.

2. Cycle 1: Civil Liberties and Anti-Eviction Struggles

The emergency was also a watershed moment that led to the emergence of civil rights movements in India. Delhi served as a national base for civil society organizations. One of the key civil society collectives that was formed after the emergency was People's Union of Civil Liberties & Democratic rights (PUCL & DR). The Delhi unit of PUCL & DR was set up in January 1977 under the chairmanship of Mr. Jai Prakash Narayana. PUCL & DR also had a national unit that remained defunct after the congress government lost election to the Janata Party in March 1977. After the congress government came back into power in 1980 the national unit of PUCL reemerged and PUDR came into existence. While PUCL was more focused on

civil rights, some of the members of PUCL realized a need to advocate for socio-economic and political rights of the masses. This led to the formation of PUDR in Feb 1981, which turned into a self-funded membership based organization. Besides its focus on the role of the state and constitutional rights of people, PUDR situated its attention on the oppression and discrimination based on one's caste, class, religion, ethnicity, and gender locations[2].

Delhi: Movements but no Displacements

The first protest cycle occurred during the next big event - the Asian games in 1983 and passage of anti-eviction bills by the Indian parliament in 1984. During this time, the government evicted squatters and demolished slums for the construction of ASIAD village (Rao, 1981). At the same time the government acquired land in the villages of Delhi to construct houses, hotels, and sports complexes. Approximately one million new migrants arrived in Delhi to work on various construction projects in Delhi. During this time, while on the one hand the existing slum dwellers were evicted and settled in the periphery of Delhi, there were more squatter settlements that sprung up in the city[3]. The workers who were from remote parts of Orissa, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, settled themselves in shanties at construction sites (Lin and Patnaik, 1982). These construction sites include the places where infrastructure such as luxury hotels, new international airport terminals, athletic facilities and stadiums were being built.

While this was the time period when Delhi served as a national base for civil society organizations such as PUCL, PUDR, Common Cause among others, we observe little activity on the anti-slum eviction front. These organizations shifted their attention to issues that emanated

[2] http://www.unipune.ac.in/snc/cssh/HumanRights/11%20HUMAN%20RIGHTS%20ORGANISATION%27S%20DOCUMENTS/16.pdf
[3] https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/politicians-greed-for-votes-stopping-delhi-achieve-slum-free-113062801046_1.html

from Asian games. Administrative corruption, and rights and working conditions (overworked, underpaid, irregular payment, and violation of labor laws etc) of laborers who were deployed in construction activities for Asian games occupied the central stage of discussions within the civil society (Lin and Patnaik, 1982). Because of the ongoing exploitation of labor at this time, PUDR filed a writ-petition to the Supreme Court of India. This petition resulted in a landmark judgment that allowed the civil society organizations to file petitions on behalf of the marginalized and exploited groups (Rubin, 1987).

Evictions continued to happen during this period. For instance, hundreds of houses were demolished in Vinod Nagar in March 1980; The DDA also conducted demolitions in Azadpur, Mahindroo Enclave, Haiderpur, and Shalimar Bagh between May-June 1980 (Rao, 1981). Further, 499 Jhuggis were demolished in New Seelampuri in Aug 1981[4]. In November 1983 the PUCL obtained a stay order against demolition in one of the colonies namely JP Colony that was facing the threat of demolition.[5] PUCL also demanded compensation for those, mostly Muslims, who were displaced from their land in Turkmen Gate area.[6] Following these events of demolition drive in early 1980s and acquisition of rural villages for large infrastructure and beautification projects of the Delhi administration for ASIAD games that resulted in further construction of squatter settlements in Delhi, an anti-encroachment bill was passed by the Indian parliament in May 1984. It primarily amended existing laws such as The Delhi Development Act, 1957, Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, The Public Premises (Evictions of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971, Punjab Municipal (New Delhi) Act, 1911 (Ghose, 1984). This bill made all the bastis in Delhi illegal.

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[4] http://www.unipune.ac.in/snc/cssh/HumanRights/08%20STATE%20AND%20HOUSING/01.pdf
[5] ‘Turkmen Gate Huts Razed’, Times of India, Nov 30, 1983
[6] ibid.

Ghose (1984) notes that a major success of this bill was that it brought many civil society organizations together. It also resulted in the creation of 'The Jhuggi-Jhopri Nivasi Adhikar Samiti,' a collective of various individuals and representatives of organizations such as Indian Social Institute, PUCL, PUDR, Unnayan (Calcutta), SEWA (Ahmedabad), Indian People's Front, IFTU, HMKP, Action India, Delhi Dehat Mazdoor Union. Sankalp, Ankur, Manushi, Centre for Science and Environment, Society for Participatory Research. The main objective of the Samiti (committee in Hindi) was to get these bills repealed. It also suggested proposals for alternative housing, and raised larger questions of rights of the exploited and oppressed sections (Ghose, 1984).

Besides, this post-emergency period also resulted in the emergence of many civil society organizations that were raising concerns of middle-class women (for example Manushi) and women from marginalized backgrounds (for example Saheli and Jagori). One key importance of Delhi for such organizations was its proximity to the center of power and politics. In addition to filing writ petitions in courts, these civil society organizations published fact finding reports in many instances of demolition and eviction in Delhi. For example, in August 1987, PUDR Delhi published a report making a case for unauthorized colonies.[7] While citing multiple demolition drives in the 1980s in Sangam Vihar, a low income unauthorized housing colony in South Delhi, they demanded the government to formulate a national housing policy that would keep the needs of the poor at the center. In the report PUDR Delhi also demanded the regularization of Sangam Vihar and compensation for those who lost their properties and were injured because of violent police action during the anti-demolition protests.

Thus, the emergency, ASIAD games, and the anti-encroachment bill led to the emergence

[7] A Case for Unauthorized Colonies, Aug 1987, People's Union for Democratic Rights, Delhi

of rights based politics and creation of many collectives of civil society organizations and activists in Delhi. There were a few incidents of demolition in the post-emergency period and Delhi did not experience any major evictions between 1977-1998 (Kundu, 2003). This was partly because, during this period, Delhi was still recovering from tremors of demolition drives that happened during emergency, and also because of the role of political leaders such as the seventh Prime Minister of India, Mr. VP Singh (Dec 1989-Nov 1990) who distributed 'VP Singh ID Card' to slum dwellers that granted them temporary relief from evictions and demolition. Approximately 2.6 lakh id cards were distributed to the slum dwellers of Delhi with 1990 as a cutoff date (Interview Ramendra Kumar DSS, 2014). However, there were a total of 61 recorded evictions from 1990-1998 as opposed to 157 evictions from 1999-2008 (Dupont, 2008; Bhan & Shivanand, 2013). During one such demolition drive, conducted by NDMC and the DDA, at Talkatora Dhobi Ghat in March 1994 the labor front of the Samajwadi Party filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court of India arguing that slum dwellers cannot be removed from their place unless they are provided alternate housing options.[8] They obtained an interim stay order from the court.[9]

Bombay: Localizing the Emergency

"To Indira Gandhi's jubilant political shores in 1980 thronged many doubtful, hollow-hearted men. Now, in less than two years, one by one they are turning into attorneys pleading for their own doom. Desperately holding on to today's mantle of power, they await tomorrow's cold tidings. Antulay in Bombay, Rao in Bangalore."

-- Bhabani Sen Gupta, *India Today*, November 15, 1981

[8] 'Delhi Court Stays 'Jhuggis' Demolition, The Times of India, March 28, 1994
[9] ibid

Bombay experienced its first demolition drive post-emergency with a vengeance. In May of 1981, The Maharashtra state government, "on recommendation of a high-powered committee, set up a separate organization to deal with the detection and speedy demolition of [slums and unauthorized structures in Greater Bombay]".[10] Mr. G.A. Walawalkar came to the rank of collector in heading this organization, at which time he began the first drive of this organization by targeting not-yet-occupied new slums, "meant to strike terror in slumlords".[11] This drive was met with opposition from the CPDR in early June, who submitted a memorandum to the state government claiming that the government had acted illegally and failed to actually target slumlords, and rather only hurt the slumdwellers who had already paid deposits on the demolished structures.[12] It seems that the drive under this guise was then stopped, but quickly recovered and redirected by Maharashtra chief minister Mr. A.R. Antulay, who gave directions that all huts on the city's pavements would be demolished by July 21.[13] This was the critical event which set the government's precedent for eviction and largely transformed activism around it for years to come. Unlike the last drive, in which opposition response from activists was delayed perhaps due to the lack of technical eviction, there was immediate response from activists, even before demolitions began. The Zopadpatti Janata Parishad (ZPJ) and Student's Federation of India came out with criticism or affidavits to resist the government's demolition agenda.[4] Despite the criticism, a huge demolition (during a downpour) of around 1,670 huts on Senapati Bapat Marg took place on July 23, wherein migrants were clearly targeted as the

[10] Staff. "New body to check slum proliferation." Times of India. May 4, 1981
[11] Allwyn, Fernandes. "Govt. blow razes new slums." Times of India. May 6, 1981
[12] Staff. "Govt. 'flouting' rules in slum demolition." Times of India. June 7, 1981
[13] Staff. "Rave pavement hutments by July 21: Antulay." Times of India. July 14, 1981.

government provided transport buses to return the evicted people to their villages. Immediately, the PUCL responded by filing an affidavit criticizing the legality of the action.[14]

The backlash worked for a time, as the government was ordered to hold off on demolitions until after the monsoons following a petition submitted by affected residents and the PUCL to the high court.[15][6] The media was also sympathetic to the circumstances of the evicted, publishing several accounts of the incident and the aftermath in the months following.

The impact that this drive had was immediately felt. By February of 1982, 'operation demolition' was back on this time targeting "illegal"[16] slums in any capacity in the city "that come in the way of development projects".[17] Throughout this pre-monsoon demolition drive, there was steady resistance from slum dwellers, opposition politicians, and civil society groups including smaller ones like Naujawan Bharat Sabha, Footpath Rehwasi Sanghatana, and larger ones like the Lawyer's Collective, CPDR, PUCL, and Bombay Slum-Dwellers' United Front,[18] which through court cases and exposure of government action continuously resisted with physical resistance and legal action.

The drive emphasizes a few points about post-Emergency evictions in Mumbai: Firstly, they are cyclical. When one begins, there is resistance, and it ends or the narrative shifts to justify the continuance of the evictions. Secondly, it is seasonal, largely depending on the monsoons – both in terms of when the government takes action and how activists criticize the move. Thirdly, although opposition politicians certainly were involved in resistance, the court cases and major criticism that led to action were brought by the activists and activist-journalists

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[14] Legal Correspondent. "Restraint on demolition of structures." Times of India. July 23, 1981.
[15] Legal Correspondent. "Demolitions off til October 15th. Times of India. July 27, 1981.
[16] Iyengar, P. "Operation demolition continues." Times of India. February 8, 1982.
[17] Staff. "No policy to allow any unauthorized structure." Times of India. April 1, 1982.
[18] Times of India ??

that challenged the government in total. They did not single out a particular party or politician in their language, but rather blamed government as a whole, and by way of pointing to injustice, forced government to shift its strategy and narrative over time. Many of the groups cited with action during this time were the same ones established during The Emergency evictions in the city, along with new ones that formed locally as necessary. These characteristics were directly impacted by the history and living memory of evictions during The Emergency, and, as we'll see, they will be evident in future threats to housing security for the poor in Mumbai.

[add info on Olga Tellis vs BMC 1985, SPARC report]

Bangalore: State-led Demolitions and Civil Society Response

With Urs ousted in the 1980 elections, Gundu Rao, one of Gandhi's chief censorship officers during The Emergency, became Chief Minister of Karnataka (Mustafa; Srivinas and Panini). Contrasting his predecessor Urs, CM Rao was flashier and more publicly oriented in his leadership style (Sen Gupta). In the post-Emergency era, with the continued flocking of the rural to the cities, what was clear was that existing infrastructure, housing markets, and amenities were not equipped to adequately handle the migration, and thus the contention that defined this period was born.[19] In Bangalore, this contention manifested in several ways which I will lay out in this section. Firstly: in the organizing to resist harmful policies and state action. Secondly: in the form of state action as demolition drive. And thirdly, the culmination of these interactions that produced the new civil society that comprised the post-emergency era.

In 1980, the Association for Voluntary Action and Services (AVAS) was established by a group of professionals and social activists (including Anita Reddy) with the mission of

[19] Bidwai, Praful. "Metropolises in Decay I – Perverse Urban Policies." Times of India. April 27, 1983.

“improving the living conditions – physical, economic, and social- of the urban poor and ensuring them a dignified existence” (AVAS). In December of 1982, Karnataka Kolegeri Nivasigala Samyuktha Sanghatane (KKNSS) was established, with the mission of lobbies actively for slum dwellers' rights. Its main demands were 'for no demolishment of slums and to give land ownership rights and basic amenities to slums.'” Around the same time that these and other organizations were being established, much of local action was organized in the realm of political party affiliation. In the early 1980s, political parties including the Dalit Sangharsha Samiti (DSS) and left parties came to slums as they saw the opportunity to recruit support, and soon after other parties came to do the same (Action Aid Meeting). In a 2014 Action Aid meeting, Bengaluru activists including Issac Arul Selva, R. Prabahkar, and Vinay Baindur reflected that they established a pattern of bringing the community together, giving them food and gifts and props needed for speeches – this way, residents of the slums were mobilized more for other groups’/parties’ agendas, and not necessarily for their own interests as a collective (Action Aid Meeting).

KKNSS, a politically oriented but not party-affiliated group, was generally an exception to the general trend of political and economic elites co-opting what might have been the “people’s movement,” so to speak. Politicians and elites that established aid organizations for slumdwellers from a stance of philanthropy were more successful at this time, I argue, because of that legacy left behind by the Urs days – there was more structural reliance and tradition in trusting government to serve the poor than there was in more radical approaches.

This trend in activism was further solidified in 1983 when a slum clearance drive against “unauthorized houses” was taken out so that the BDA land it was on could be repurposed for a

new housing layout.[20] A Congress (I) leader ordered a judicial probe into the "inhuman and cruel" demolition of 75 huts in the city by the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA).[21] This probe was later rejected on the ground that, according to the minister for housing and urban development, "At this rate, we shall not be able to ensure orderly growth of Bangalore."[22]

In these post-Emergency evictions, the influence of the Emergency is clear – whether it be in the public consciousness at the time (as in Mumbai, where there was a strong set of civil society groups and anti-eviction media that came from it) or not (as in Bangalore, where Indira Gandhi's legacy was linked to prosperity and political parties generally co-opted land-based civil society activism potential before it could begin). Urs's legacy had garnered more buy-in from poorer voters in their belief in government, and the leadership of some of the civil society groups of Bangalore were more tied and connected to the elite. For example, even the more radical KKNSS was begun in a largely charitable position, by Selvaraj, MP Swamy, and Anita Reddy. While Anita Reddy may have been for the people, she was certainly not of the people. She was the daughter of very successful sweets mogul Mr. Dwaraknath Reddy (who made his fortune as Chairman of the Nutrine Group of Companies) from which he established the Ramanarpanam Trust and made Anita the leader of it (AVAS). According to the Association for Voluntary Action (AVAS) website, which was last updated in 2008, it seems, Anita Reddy was not only greatly tied to some of the most prominent civil society groups of the time, but also very much the social and political elite, as an heiress herself. She was at one point nominated to serve on the Karnataka Slum Clearance Board (AVAS). Not only does this show the nature of the slum clearance board in Karnataka as being in some ways and at some times linked to the anti-

[20] Staff. "Demolition takes political colour." Times of India. May 31, 1983.
[21] Staff. "Plea for probe into demolition rejected." Times of India. June 8, 1983.
[22] Balakrishnan, S. and A. Mishra. "Saffron combine may not find sailing too easy." Times of India. February 22, 1998.

eviction/slum dwellers' rights organizations, it also shows the nature of the organizations, that there is some feasibility toward a cooperation of sorts.

Meanwhile in Mumbai, the very active PUCL was founded on the basis of not being linked to ANY political parties during The Emergency and was working explicitly against government action (PUCL has since grown in activism in Bangalore as well) (PUCL). In the wake of the pavement evictions, Bombay journalist Olga Tellis filed a case against the BMC for its action in evicting slum-dwellers (this case's decision went on to be a landmark in both justifying and condemning demolitions) and slum dweller organizations sprang from the communities to resist the action, like the Zapadpatti Rehavasi Sangh (cite). There was a tendency to negotiate rights to the city by demanding it – not relying on an intermediary who was part of the government to intervene.

This critical moment of the first post-Emergency evictions in these two places, was the first experiment in the relationship between civil society and the new strong-man led government on the topic of slum dwellers' rights. Generally, we can see that Bangalore's slum-rights movement was more linked to its political parties in conjunction with newly sprung and largely elite-led civil society groups. While in Mumbai, the resistance action was somewhat more anti-government (not in the sense of anarchy but in the sense of not being tied to one particular politician or party) and "of the people." This was clearly influenced by the two city's differing histories in the Emergency era, and it will remain consequential for subsequent critical events.

3. Cycle 2: Ethno-Religious Targeting and Movement Fragmentation

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, as Congress Party dominance continued to break down, so too did the secular pluralist ideal that Nehru had sought to produce. The violent politics of ethno-religious nationalism took shape in distinct ways across India's regions. It began earliest in

Delhi with the anti-Sikh violence that followed the assassination of Indira Gandhi. In Mumbai, it took the form of first anti-Tamil politics, but soon gave way to anti-Muslim violence as Maharashra's ethno-nationalist movements linked up with broader, more widespread anti-Muslim politics of Hindutva. In Bangalore, these politics took shape as an anti-Tamil politics, during the so-called Cauvery Riots.

Delhi: Operation Pushback

Describe the anti-Sikh pogroms (cite Stanley Tambia) and bit Sikhs not living in slums. Relocation did happen

- Limited evictions -
- Limited hindutva (more of a muslim city, reckoning about the anti-Sikh violence, more centralized Congress power, anti-Muslim violence would have gotten more attention.)
- Impacts?

Bombay: Urban Cleansing

Why was Bombay ripe for anti-Muslim targeted evictions when the Ayodhya-inspired violence took hold across the country in the early 1990s?

- Shiv Sena: Anti-Tamil violence
- The BMC continued to link exclusionary politics with slum clearance in the 1980s
- When Ayodhya happened, the conditions were ripe for urban cleansing
- Impacts?

- Targeted evictions, but civil society organizations continued to be fairly "color blind" and Hindu dominated

Bangalore: Cauvery Riots

Tamil communities had been the target of much exclusionary politics in Karnataka, in ways that brought together anti-Dalit politics with ethnic scapegoating. The state government largely distanced themselves from these politics, while also implicitly supporting these politics. However, civil society groups were savvy and they recognized the caste-based and ethnically motivated persecution and the disproportionate impact that ongoing evictions were having on the lower caste Tamils living in Bangalore's informal settlements.

- Implications: civil society groups merged with dravidian political parties and the civil society organizations engaged with party politics through explicitly Dravidian movements.

4. Cycle 3: Post-Liberalization Infrastructure and Aesthetic Politics

In the early 1990s, India finally gave in to the pressures of the International Monetary Fund, taking a structural adjustment loan that would partly set the course of the political economy and urban property market for decades to come (Weinstein, 91-92). This loan and other policies undertaken by the central government that moved India into a more neoliberal state would manifest themselves quite differently in Mumbai and Bengaluru, but however the changes may have been in these two cities, they both maintained similar goals: to become "world class cities." In these cities, slums were not only an eyesore or a case of inhumane living conditions, but they were also taking up valuable commodities in the land they were situated on – or as Liza

Weinstein puts it, state governments like Maharashtra wanted to "turn slums into gold" (99). This came in several phases (and continues to this day), but for this section we will focus on the first of it: The first world-class city evictions of 1997.

Delhi: Enviro-Aesthtic (1996-1997): extensive evictions, limited protest

The second protest cycle in Delhi, we suggest, began in the 1996-97 period. In this period we see formation of many activist organizations in response to the new round of evictions. We argue that, in this period, the economic liberalization of India in early 1990s, Yamuna action plan of 1993 (a bilateral project between the Government of India and Japan), and new government's and courts' environmentalist discourse around the closure of polluting industries generated a different political consciousness among the middle class citizens of Delhi of which slums became the primary target. However, this also drew attention of many civil society activists and resulted in the formation of a new set of collectives that got involved in anti-eviction movements. There was a rise in the number of PILs filed by middle- and upper-middle class residents of Delhi in the mid-1990s. Okhla Factory Owners Association in 1994, and Pitam Pura Improvement Committee in 1995 filed petitions in the court to remove slums from their areas. Along with them some 27 factory owners associations and RWAs included their petitions (Dunu Roy in 'Dilli Kiski Hai?: Yojana ki Rajneeti aur Aniyojit ka Hastakshep, (Whose Delhi is it?: The Politics of Planning and Intervention of the Unplanned). They all used environmental protection as a narrative to remove slums.

This enviro-aesthetics turn that resulted in slum evictions and demolitions began with a petition in the Supreme Court of India filed by MC Mehta in 1985 concerning Delhi's pollution level. While the case was filed in 1985, the supreme court did not pass any order until 1996. In

1996 the court issued orders that led to the closure of 168 polluting industries in Delhi. The Delhi administration was carrying out demolition drives in different parts of Delhi. For instance, in Oct 1996, the District Task Force and the DDA demolished slums in Nasirpur and Mahabir Enclaves in Dabri. Up to 150,000 yards of land were cleared by the Delhi administration[23]. This act of the administration resulted in violent protests by 10,000 slum dwellers in which a few people were killed and many were injured. Later, the government announced Rs 5 lakhs compensation for the families of those who were killed. Also, in this period, there were a series of reports published by different government departments that bolstered this environmental discourse that emerged from MC Mehta's petition and later Supreme Court orders. For example, in 1997 the Government of India Ministry of Environment & Forest published a white paper and action plan on Delhi's pollution[24]. Later, in 1998-99 and 1999-2000 the annual administrative reports published by the Delhi Development Authority titled 'Widening Horizon for Better Tomorrow', and 'Delhi with a Vision beyond Tomorrow' respectively share the anti-slums sentiments. In the year 1999, a Report on Slums in Delhi was published by the Slum Department, New Delhi. All of this culminated in another court order in the year 2000 that resulted in the closure of 100,000 industries in unauthorized areas that included Delhi's slums as a result of which 150,000 workers became unemployed (ibid). The petitions filed by the middle-class residents of Delhi, and court orders blamed the lower classes for all the issues in Delhi and they demanded strong action against the slum dwellers. As a result, in 1999 the labor class of Delhi was blamed for the pollution and unsanitary conditions in the city. Many legislations were passed to control and regulate the activities of laborers. For instance - act against polluting industries, rickshaw pullers,

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[23] "Demolition leads to mob violence in south-west Delhi", The Times of India, October 17, 1996, The Times of India News Service

[24] (http://urbanemissions.info/wp-content/uploads/docs/India-1997-CPCB-White-Paper-on-Delhi-Air-Pollution.pdf)

street vendors, public buses, domestic work, and waster workers were passed.This was a period when the dominance of the elite class in the planning practices got stronger (Dunu Roy in ‘Dilli Kiski Hai?: Yojana ki Rajneeti aur Aniyojit ka Hastakshep, (Whose Delhi is it?: The Politics of Planning and Intervention of the Unplanned). This enviro-aesthetics turn resulted in a number of evictions in 2001-02 (Bhan & Shivanand, 2013). A total of 32 settlements were demolished and about 14,876 people were displaced. This was the period when the middle-class population of Delhi instrumentalized the power of Public Interest Litigations (PILs) that culminated in the displacement of slum dwellers throughout Delhi and terms like “encroachers”, “nuisance”, and “dirty” became part of the judicial narratives (Bhan & Shivanand, 2013). In other words, these PILs in Delhi began to target the population who were earlier protected by their elected representatives as the primary objective of PILs shifted from poverty and juridical reforms to environmental issues (Bhuwania, 2016).

This closure of industries and its impact on the urban poor of Delhi that included the majority of slum dwellers, contributed to the generation of a second protest cycle in Delhi. While workers were protesting, this was also a period that led to the formation of many more civil society organizations and collectives. For instance, Hazard Center and Jhuggi Jhopdi Ekta Manch were formed in 1997, Sanjha Manch, Ashray Adhikar Abhiyan, and Housing and Land Rights Network came up in the late 1990s, and Humana People to People India was formed in 1998. These organizations were advocating for the rights of workers, slum dwellers, and homeless people in Delhi. Most of these organizations were working with the slum dwellers who were facing threats of evictions and displacement. The national human rights commission was also active in this period. In the case of a demolition drive that was carried out in July 2000 in Rangpuri Pahari, as a result of police brutality and demolition by the Land Acquisition

collectorate and DDA, the residents invited the National Human Rights Commission to investigate the case[25]. The residents claimed that they were legitimate residents with possession of ration cards, and involved VP Singh to stop the demolition drive.

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<Why in 1997 did activist organizations begin to form in response to the new round of evictions, when they hadn't formed in response to those in the earlier 1990s?> explore the answers?

- Funding? (Ford Foundation? Action Aid India?)
- The government's new discourse (and the publicity being given to these evictions) motivated activists – perhaps the new environmentalist discourse around the closure of the polluting industries – MC Mehta's case
- Middle class political consciousness? (the faction acting against the anti-poor civil society)
- Was there a high profile eviction event that drew attention?

Bombay: SRA (1995-1996): extensive evictions, extensive protest

As Congress's national power was fading, new parties stepped into the fold, and in Mumbai, that was the Shiv Sena (Weinstein). They ran on a campaign aimed at their working-class constituents: that they would provide free houses to 40 lakh slum dwellers, support and embolden Hindu nationalism, and promised a greater Bombay. With all of this fuel, Shiv Sena

[25] "NHRC probes alleged Rangpuri brutality by Delhi police", The Times of India News Service, July 15, 2000, Rahul Gupta

rose to power in Mumbai in 1995.[26] Since Antulay's mass pavement evictions of 1981, spontaneous demolition drives and sporadic individual demolitions, sometimes followed by rehabilitation but not always, had remained somewhat consistent and cyclical in the city.

Through this time, civil society groups grew in number and influence, to the point that any major eviction could virtually not go on without some resistance – including morchas, writ petitions, write-in editorials and more, or at the very least a call for rehabilitation on the grounds of humanity (Times of India). This constant activism and resistance to government sponsored drives over the years and the introduction of neoliberal policy at the time had come to what seemed like a compromise between demolition and rehabilitation: the Slum Redevelopment Scheme (SRS) (Weinstein). Using funds from the Prime Minister's Grant, the SRS proved a popular and publicly oriented approach to slum redevelopment as it allowed for land to accumulate value and for slum dwellers to get new housing through the contract with a private builder. This, however, has been imperfect, and sometimes dwellers had to be "convinced" to sign on to the project, or others were evicted for the purpose of redevelopment that they would not be a part of.[27.]

This SRS project, the campaign of the Shiv Sena, and the fact that about half of the population of Bombay lived in slums at this time all points to the fact that the "slum problem"[28] was very much in the realm of the public consciousness. It wasn't an isolated issue, but rather largely integrated into the discussion of how to move the city into being the "'ideal' metropolis."[29]

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[26] Deshmukh, S. "As BMC continues Saver Versova Beach drive: Farmers are left in the lurch." Times of India. June 3, 1997.
[27] Staff. "A lot of fuss over a dud scheme." Times of India. October 28, 1997.
[28] Sanaolkar, S. "The day the bulldozers came." Times of India. May 20, 1998.
[29] Staff. "State will crack down on illegal hutments in October." Times of India. July 11, 1997.

In this time, there was an explosion of various drives that occurred simultaneously or overlappingly in the city. The first demolition drive was smaller but very symbolic in action and resistance—the Cuffe Parade heliport demolition very much represents government policy at the time. The first inklings of the plan to replace centrally located slums with a helipad were publicized in April 1997, and the drive was taken out after months of rare, shared resistance by low, middle, and high-income residents of the area in May 1998.[30] The project was delayed for several years because of this resistance, but today there is a helipad in Cuffe Parade.

Secondly was the Shiv Sena's drive against "illegal Bangaldeshis" and migrants, carried out between June 14-July 5, 1997. Civic organizations criticized and resisted the move during the monsoon season, successfully advocating to hold off on further demolitions until after the monsoon.[31] Groups widely deplored the government's ethnically motivated drive, and pushed the government away from being able to use such logic in future drives.

Chief Minister Manohar Joshi carried out a long-winded drive against "illegal huts" in the post Monsoon era.[32][16] Activists pointed out that the government had failed in its promise to provide the poor with free houses and is instead demolishing their huts, that the SRD scheme is being used to 'evict slumdwellers and hand over land to builders.'[33] They resisted through community co-led morchas, press conferences, and even a hunger strike against the evictions.[34] Civil society groups involved in this resistance included the Nivarra Hakk Suraksha Samiti (led in part by architect PK Das and actress Shabana Azmi), residents' associations, the Save Bombay

[30] Times of India ????
[31] Times of India ???
[32] ????
[33] ????
[34] ????

Committee, Youth for Unitary and Voluntary Action, and the Maharashtra Minorities Forum, and some Bollywood-industry figures, like Shabana Azmi.

Finally, throughout the year 1997 and into the next, there was a longstanding drive to evict slum dwellers who occupied Sanjay Gandhi National Park. The drive was initiated by the Bombay Environmental Action Group's advocacy to protect the ecology of the park, but this same group secondarily proposed that the evicted people should be given rehabilitation.[35] The eviction was mainly met with demands for rehabilitation because of how long the people had lived there, but there were no claims to their fundamental right to live in the park (cite).
These drives represented a critical event in the history of slum activism in Mumbai because of a few factors. Firstly, there was a new sense of the economic opportunity in slum redevelopment that both hurt and helped slumdwellers. This would lead to new focuses of activism on the way in which redevelopment/rehabilitation was carried out, rather than if it happened at all. Secondly, the government taking on multiple drives at once points to the urgency of the neo-liberalizing city in needing to clear the city of encroachments and improve it – slumdwellers and activists had to adopt a variety of approaches to meet these challenges. Finally, the fact of government failure to the point of betrayal (in razing rather than building houses for the poor) speaks to how this was a critical moment in the nature of resistance to harmful government actions.

The Shiv Sena promised 40 lakh free houses to the poor, but then turned around and undertook some serious and sustained summary evictions instead. While opposition politicians were certainly vocal and active in their descent to this, I argue that it was the civil society, now more and more incorporated with non-government city elite, that truly defined how Mumbai would resist demolition and unfair practices of rehabilitation. The effect of this time was evident

[35] Times of India ???

in the drive taken out just before the monsoon season for a railway project in Prem Nagar in Behrampada, wherein, after, an evicted resident was quoted in saying, "'Take us anywhere… but give us a roof over our heads before the rains.' And so they sit amid the rubble that was once home, now despairing, now hopeful that some help will come. 'Where is Shabana Azmi?' they ask."[36] The people, once evicted, do not ask for their MP's protection, they look for the ones that have now proven a commitment to the rights of slumdwellers, and that is now found in the civil society.

Bangalore: Infrastructural (1997-1998): extensive evictions: extensive protest

"'Bombay's loss is Bangalore's gain.'"

- Syed Moh'd of Beary's Real Estates, 1995[18]

Having grown in economic power fairly consistently over the past few decades, Bangalore's leadership was looking to take it to the next step in this era of liberalization. In the mid 1990s, there was a major real estate boom in Bangalore which suggested the shift that would occur over the next few years. One journalist in 1995 remarked that most of South India's cities were rising, Bangalore was "fast replacing Bombay as the country's premiere city."[37] At this time, the Karnataka government became friendlier with private builders and developers, and the Karnataka Ownership & Promoters Association (KOAPA) also more frequently interacted with the government. There was a sentiment and a plan that the city center was not the place for the poor and middle class, and so the plan to develop 'satellite townships' surrounding the city's green belt, was put in place so that "this particular segment can have a safe roof over their heads."[38]

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[37] Bageshree, Paradkar. "Boom time for Bangalore builders." Times of India. April 7, 1995.

[38] (Staff. "The Way Out." *Times of India.* 8 April, 1981.)?????

At this same time, with multinationals flocking to the booming but relatively more affordable city, the IT sector began to overshadow the industrial sector that was once made up of distinct local economies that catered to middle and low-income groups in decades prior (Benjamin, 36). A new, corporate image of Bangalore was shaped, and in that influx of land developers flocking from Mumbai and Delhi came a series of demolitions and displacements that moved middle and low-income groups to the poorly serviced the peripheries of the city (Solomon). This shift away from mixed-class economic settings that had once made social mobility somewhat of a possibility for the city's poor to a separated and corporate structure was disastrous not only for the living conditions of slum dwellers (who were continuously pushed outside the city or just plainly evicted without any rehabilitation, though the latter was rarer), but also for their options for activism and advocating for themselves (Solomon). In the pre-liberalization, local-economy centered era, high, middle and low-income groups were more intertwined because of the economic interactions that were obligatory to that structure, causing more of a "vote bank" structure, wherein poorer groups had a more proactive role in shaping the economic setting (Solomon, 48). In the new corporate "enclaves" created and perpetuated by Master Plan policies of the 1990s and beyond, the poor and the elite are further separated, making them more and more disconnected from sources of political means (Solomon).

In trying to make Bangalore a 'world class city', the government constructed a new flyover highway, malls to replace more traditional markets, and stadiums and infrastructure to house the 1997 National Games. Initial excitement over the prospect of a city on the verge of world-class greatness faded as time went on. "Walking around the pathways that have been disrupted by the construction and demolition, a common refrain from squatters and wealthier shop-owners alike relates to the chief minister's main intention to make Bangalore into a neat

and clean Singapore. Most now realize that they are the dirt to be cleaned off' (Benjamin, 50). Part of the strategy to make Bangalore the next greatest city, cleaning off this dirt, was to become a center of India, or, more specifically, to "challenge Delhi" by hosting the Indian National Games (Mills, 223).

Responding to the pressure to be competitive (like China or other developing countries) in international sports competitions like the Olympics and World Cup, the Indian National Games were instituted in 1927 as a means to screen athletic talent and link athletic organizations nationally (Heitzman, 5). Being the center of focus and the setting for making India's representative athletes, hosting the Games provided an opportunity for city planners to attract investment to construct infrastructure and alter the urban space (Heitzman, 5). Thus, Chief Minister Moily lobbied to have the Games hosted in Bangalore, paying USD $30,000 to the Indian Olympic Association as a guarantee amount for the honor (Heitzman). Unfortunately, the National Games Committee had much more trouble than they had anticipated in attracting corporate sponsors, and faced a series of financial troubles because of it, forcing them to postpone the Games several times until finally settling in early summer of 1997 (Heitzman).

There were two major demolitions, and one housing project, that were particularly integral to making this a Critical Event in Veena Das's framework. First was the National Games Village Construction, A huge housing project that was originally intended in part to serve as housing for bureaucrats and the other part to be sold as private citizens, after it served as housing for the 6,000 athletes during the Games, sparked a set of resistance from civil society. After hearing of the project from a journalist, a writ petition was filed on January 7, 1995 by several NGOs including Citizens for Voluntary Initiative for the City (CIVC), KKNSS, Indian Society for Environmental Studies, and others against the order for the construction. There were claims

against the environmental impact of the structure, the fact that the construction did not follow due procedure, and that because of that change it also skipped the usual requirement of alotting a certain amount of low-income units to be provided (Heitzman). There was a protest at the construction site, led by the petitioning NGOs (mostly environmental activists) and which reached a maximum attendance of about 500 people, a number of whom joined from the slum across from the construction. The protest lasted a few hours, dispersing after the HUD director came for 10 minutes and then department. The government changed the orders, making them legal, and the petition was dismissed, with no changes and no low-income housing to be provided from it (Heitzman).

The second major event at this time was the Slum Eviction & Displacement at National Games Village, Indira Gandhi Slum: The slum dwellers most affected by the construction of National Games Village did not take part in the aforementioned protest. In constructing the Village, architects planned to relocate a drain to where part of the slum was situated, and plans were made to relocate the slumdwellers to Leggare, on the outskirts of the city. Coincidentally, there was fire that destroyed most of the huts they planned to demolish (it was suspected to be arson but it was confirmed by residents later that it was indeed an accident). At this point, several NGOs, including the Bangalore Urban Poverty Alleviation Program (BUPP), AVAS, Goodwill International Association (GWIA), and Samatha Sainik Dal (SSD) and 34 members from the slum, created a committee to negotiate the slum dwellers' resettlement. Per the negotiation, 184 dwellers would be rehabilitated on site where the government constructed them brick and concrete homes with kitchens. The other 110 residents rejected the far-away Leggare site and eventually negotiated with the government to take up a dump space near their original homes where they were assisted with money and assistance from NGOs. They were also helped by the

fact that 50 of the residents were construction workers. The perhaps surprising takeaway from this eviction was that, “paradoxically, the dislocations caused by the National Games Village actually resulted in an improvement in the social organization and housing situation for these citizens,” according to the residents themselves (Heitzman, 14).

Third was the displacement that occurred at Karnataka State Football Stadium, Ashok Nagar. In the one of the endzones of the Karnataka State Football Stadium, home to the state’s football association, was the settlement called Ashok Nagar by its 1,5000 residents. Some of the residents claimed to have lived there in mostly pucca structures for 30 and said they had helped construct the stadium. There were several attempts to evict them in the years leading up to the Games, but they had gotten a stay order to remain. On May 17th, 1997, the National Games Committee finally decided to evict the dwellers. “… Representatives of the Bangalore Metropolitan Task Force (BMTF) and the Bangalore City Corporation (BCC) showed up at the settlement between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. with workmen and a police escort, forcing the residents out of their humble homes and then laying into the brickwork with sledge hammers. Police had to resort to ‘mild caning’ to keep irate people from blocking the demolition. The evicted residents began a *rasta roko* maneuver, blocking the road to Ulsoor for several hours, charging that no alternative housing had been found for them, and they had not been informed ahead of time about their eviction” (Heitzman, 14-15). At this point, newspapers, politicians, and NGOs became involved, and leaders of local slum dwellers associations came to lead peaceful sit-ins. State MLAs came and listened to residents while stating their ignorance of the action before it was taken. It was under their leadership that negotiations for their rehabilitation began with the government’s prisons minister serving as liaison. Eventually, it was decided the families would be moved 20 km away to Ullal near Kengeri. Some rejected this resettlement at first,

about 50 of whom (including pregnant women) continued the rasta roko, claiming it was too far from their original homes and lacked civic amenities. Eventually, “even the die-hard protesters" moved to Kengeri (Heitzman, 15). “By the time the Games began there was only a graded dirt area at the end of the stadium, cordoned off with a corrugated metal fence” (Heitzman, 15).

Firstly, the construction of the National Games Village was monumental in that the government had planned to make a profit, along with collecting enough revenue to pay for the project, off of selling flats not reserved for government officials to private citizens after the Games. Even though they were to evict a slum in order to construct *that very building*, they went out of their way to avoid provisions requiring some units in new residential constructions to be reserved for lower-income groups (Heitzman). Alongside the evictions and displacements due to the Games, this points clearly to the fact that the government will rehabilitate upon eviction, but only on the periphery of the city, leave them if it is more convenient, or an actual dump site (which the residents preferred to the displacement).

These demolitions that came from the National Games transformed activism and set new precedents in how eviction and resettlement would be handled by residents and supporting NGOs. From the evidence found, there were two major evictions in the name of the National Games, one of which was overall positive, because of successful resistance by slumdwellers and NGOs which allowed for slum development en situ. The other, at the football stadium, was resisted with arguably more radical resistance, even staging and then continuing on in a rasta roko for rehabilitation closer to the site of eviction, but yet in the end, they were all forced to a far away site. It is interesting to note how Heitzman describes the process in each case as “negotiation” between groups, wherein multiple parties are brought into conversation. It can be concluded that evictions will almost always come immediately with a rehabilitation (though no

guarantees on the quality), as long as NGOs intervene and there is "negotiation," and that there is more of a trade in these interactions than demands one way or the other. The people may be asked to move, but in both cases they were given at least meagre monetary compensation by the groups evicting them, or were given materials and assistance in redeveloping their houses at new sites. The resistance is not so radical and demanding but rather negotiated through third-parties, who also take on the responsibility of redevelopment.

In the years following the 1997 National Games evictions and the subsequent ones similar in nature, Bangalore experienced a mini-Renaissance of civil society action. One such action was the establishment of *Slum Jagatthu* in 2000*,* a Kannada Monthly "published by and for slum dwellers of Karnataka" (Slumjagatthu), by former staff, including editor-in-chief Isaac Arul Selva of *Slum Suddi* from the NGO Jana Sahayog, which had closed down that year. The magazine's editors, frustrated by the mainstream media's lack of representation of the issues, lives, and stories of slumdwellers, began it as way to focus in on those topics (Sonne). The magazine, while having taken a haitus in the mid-2010s, still publishes today. Also in 2000, Karnataka Kolageri Nivasigala Janti Kriya Samiti (Joint Action Committee for Slum Dwellers Rights in Karnataka) was started (Action Aid Meeting). It was a state-level organization focused on primarily the unorganized labor sector, bringing together Dalit coalitions and other groups. These adaptations rose to the challenge of the times: one to bring the poor into public life through slum-published magazine, and the other to unite the unorganized sector of labor in a liberalizing economy.

A major distinction between the 1981 evictions' narratives of diligence in maintenance of infrastructure was internal conflict: rich versus for the sake of the city. In the late 90s, it was now

internal conflict marked with external motivations: to be nationally and therefore globally competitive in a tangible way. Through new economic avenues, this idea was no longer abstract but just out of reach. Mumbai had long been the financial and business capital of India- both in reality and in perception, and there was a subconscious sensitivity among the people when they heard the promises made by the Shiv Sena government or Bombay First (Weinstein, 105). It was trying to regain what it once was, so to speak. At the same time, Bangalore was one of the rising stars of the south, and sought to become the new premier city of the country, to replace both Mumbai and Delhi in one fell swoop. The mechanism by which they achieved that was liberalization of the 1990s, “a transitional stage between an older model of attracting capital from the central and state government to provide advantages for a population of public-serving bureaucrats and an emerging model of ‘public/private cooperation’ that assembles institutions within the space of civil society to focus capital on consumable culture.” (Heitzman, 6). In both places, this transition had consequences for the city’s slum dwellers.

While Mumbai’s 1997 drives were mainly general and not for a particular purpose besides general illegality or environmental impact (outside of the Cuffe Parade helipad demolition), Bangalore’s were extremely specific in both cases leading up to the 1997 National Games. In both Bangalore and Mumbai, there was demand for rehabilitation, preferably en situ, but as we saw the nature of getting that rehabilitation approved was different and the mechanism of giving it was as well. In Mumbai, the agencies involved often passed the torch to another agency to take on the rehabilitation, whereas in Bangalore, that rehabilitation was usually instituted by the same agency that undertook the demolition: the slum clearance board (Benjamin). This may explain why the approach to getting rehabilitation was a “negotiation” in Bangalore, while it was more of legal demand in Mumbai.

The other piece that becomes more and more important as these cities become more populated is the geographical differences between these cities. The physical space that makes up Bangalore is very different to that of Mumbai. The policy in Bangalore is to keep moving the poor outward and outward, and because it's a land-locked city with no coast in sight, they physically can do this. Additionally, because of the Green Belt between the city center and these "satellite" communities, there is even greater physical and visual separation of these peripheries from the city center. With the poor further and further pushed out, the sentiment "out of sight, out of mind" for the larger public consciousness stands tall, as Solomon puts it, in the late 90s, "poverty issues [were] seen as separate from the city" (38). Mumbai, on the other hand, is a peninsula and very much limited in the space that it can simply move the poor and middle classes outward to. Though there were some suggestions to move the poor to New Bombay in the early 1980s,[19] this idea that they can move the poor out of the central city simply can not work in the same way it has and technically (to an extent) can in Bangalore. There is simply not infinite space to do this. Thus, it makes sense that in the age of liberalization, the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme made more sense as an (imperfect and unfortunately often abused) method of developing slum land while eventually rehousing the land's original inhabitants.

Because of the structural, geographical, historical, and economic divergences of Mumbai and Bangalore as they both undertook policies of liberalization, activism around housing rights for the poor changed and adapted according to this critical event *and* the history preceding it in total. Mumbai continued to be led by civil society groups and slum dwellers residents' associations making radical demands and leading protests claiming right to land and city, while Bangalore shied away from demanding a right to the land, and rather slum dwellers and their

allied NGOs worked with and through government cooperation to come out with the most optimal solution.

5. World Class City (distinct responses)

[Add Bombay First and the Bangalore Municipal Task Force/KOAPA here somewhere/ add megacity stuff] The evictions that materialized after consultants and politicans adopted the language of the world class city. 2004, 2005.

Delhi's World Class City Evictions (2004 - 2010)

The third protest cycle in Delhi began in the 2004-05 period after a series of court orders that allowed the government to demolish slums for the Commonwealth Games. In an interview published in the Times of India on June 12th 2005[39], the then chief minister of Delhi, Sheila Dixit shared her aspiration of converting Delhi into a world class city and commonwealth games and asian games to be vehicles of it. According to her a "world-class city means, aesthetics, culture, heritage, and social fabric of the city." The Commonwealth games acted as a catalyst to realize her dream to make Delhi a world class city. The urban imagery of turning Delhi into a global metropolis and a world-class city was further documented in the Master Plan for Delhi 2021 (DDA, 2007: Introduction), which was a rearticulation of the government's approach to urban branding in previous master plans (Narayanan, 2020). Some of the projects that were part of this world-class city imagery and urban restructuring were construction of malls, highways,

[39] YES, I DO GET HURT: THE PRIVATE I SERIES Delhi's turnaround, its clean air, regulated traffic and green cover are attributed to its feisty chief minister, Sheila Dixit. Here, she talks about CNG, André Gide and her iPod, June 12th 2005, The Times of India

bridges, metro-rail system, luxury hotels, theme parks, beautification campaigns, and slum demolitions (Dupont, 2011).

Slums were being demolished and slum dwellers were being evicted to transfer land to attract capital investment (Bhaviskar, 2014). In March-June 2004, 35,000 families that were inhabiting Yamuna Pushta colony in Delhi were displaced as a result of a demolition drive for a beautification project for the 2010 Commonwealth Games[40]. It was followed by a series of demolition drives in other parts of Delhi. According to Ramender Kumar (Interview, 2014), There was a court order in response to a Residential Welfare Association petition demanding to clear seven slums in Vikaspuri. The court ordered demolition of two of the slums in the area. 900 police carried out the eviction without any warning. Just a small unsigned piece of paper was posted on a Friday saying that it would be demolished. On Saturday and Sunday, the courts were closed. On Monday, they filed a petition to the Supreme Court. The court rejected the petition, saying "who invited them to come to Delhi" (Interview, Ramendra Kumar DSS, 2014) Similarly, 150 homes in Mayur Vihar and 300 homes in Patparganj were demolished in September 2005[41], and 850 homes were demolished near Shakarpur in East Delhi[42] in April 2006. According to a Journalist, Milan Kumar (Interview, 2014), Commonwealth games evictions were not reported and news were highly censored both by the government news outlet and national dailies such as Times of India. Evictions were happening across Delhi. Slums in South Delhi also came into the folds of these demolition drives. Between 2007-2010, slums in Dargah Bhure Shah Camp in Nizamuddin East, Prabhu Market and Prabhu Market Extension and Sai Baba Camp in Lodhi

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[40] India: Forced Evictions Skyrocket Due to Commonwealth Games, Housing and Land Rights Network, October 13, 2010, accessed online at escr-net.org

[41] Whose City is it Anyway?", The Times of India, December 29, 2005; "SC likens inaction on squatters to gifting away public property", The Times of India, October 1, 2005

[42] 850 Jhuggis near Yamuna Demolished", The Hindu, April 22, 2006

Colony, Jhuggi-Jhopri Colony in Prem Nagar, Gadia Lohar Basti in INA Colony, Bengali Camp and Shaheed Arjun Das Camp in East Kidwai Nagar, Indira Gandhi Camp near New Khanna Market in Lodhi Colony were demolished and slum dwellers were evicted as part of the urban restructuring project for commonwealth games (HLRN, 2010)[43]. Most of these evictions between 2004-07 were a direct result of court orders against the PILs filed by different resident welfare associations and trade associations (Bhan, 2009). This was not a mere coincidence that this rise in PILs filed by RWAs followed a participatory governance scheme namely Bhagidari that the government put in place in 2000. This scheme not only granted the middle-and upper class citizens an “exclusive privileged access to both the upper- and lower-level bureaucracy” (Ghertner, 2015), but also confidence and power to access the court to demand removal of slums from their vicinity.

While slums were being erased and slum dwellers were being rendered homeless as part of a city beautification project for a world-class city, a new set of civil society collectives emerged during this world class city eviction cycles. Shahri Adhikar Manch: Begharon Ke Liye (Urban Rights Forum: For the Homeless), a forum of 20 organizations, was set up in Sept 2008. Nazdeek, an independent organization of lawyers, academics, business professionals, and researchers, was formed in 2011. Further another coalition of organizations, activist, and social movements called National Forum for Housing Rights came into existence in Oct 2012. The civil society organizations and collectives that were formed in the earlier protest cycles in Delhi were still active.

This network of NGOs, activists, and journalists, were producing fact finding reports,

[43] "India: Forced Evictions Skyrocket Due to Commonwealth Games ", Housing and Land Rights Network, October 13, 2010, accessed online at escr-net.org

filing court cases, organizing workshops and training, and in some cases facilitating protests and demostrations. In Feb 2009, Ramendra Kumar, founding member of Delhi Shramik Sangathan (DSS), organized a march of slum dwellers from Mandi House to Parliament as a response to the government's demolition drive in the name of Commonwealth Games[44]. This indeed resulted in some positive changes in the Slum Policy as organizations like DSS were invited to review the policy (Interview, Ramendra Kumar, 2014), however it was not sufficient to stop demolitions and ensure resettlement of displaced people.

Further, the civil society organizations in Delhi, as compared to other cities like Bombay, have been considered weak when it comes to slum related issues because of the direct involvement of the central government in the slum related matters (Dupont, 2020). Also, the actions of organizations functioning out of Delhi have been sporadic and fragmented (Kumar 2008; Dupont 2020).

Mumbai World Class City Evictions

Making Mumbai into Shanghai 2004-2005.

Bangalore's WCC Evictions

BAFT, 2004-5.

Conclusion

[44] Slum dwellers march against demolition, Tribune News Service, Feb 21, 2009

Through this analysis, what is found is not only consequential to academic social movement theory, but also for practical purposes of use to activists today. In each critical event, there was a political or economic transformation of some kind that led to social transformation. In the first post-Emergency eviction in Mumbai, strong-man led and motivated slum demolitions brought forth a large array of civil society organizations and grassroots movements to resist government action as a whole. As evictions like this continued, so did these groups continue to grow, uniting lawyers, journalists and other advocates with slumdwellers in radical protests. In Bangalore, the first post-Emergency eviction set a precedent for being very specifically focused on a particular area, and shied away from all out demolition in the same way that Mumbai did. The civil society organizations that grew from this time in Bangalore were more philanthropic than radical, and approached the subject of rights with more cooperation and negotiation than the movement in Mumbai.

In the late 1990s liberalization-era evictions, there was yet another transformation in policy and then in activism. In the age of liberalization, the narrative of eviction for the betterment of the city turned toward eviction for the betterment of the city's international standing. Public-private partnerships in development and subsequent eviction played a larger and larger role, and civil society adapted to new challenges. In Mumbai, multi-faceted and simultaneous summary eviction still served as the main mode of government action, and at the same time the development of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme served as both a mode of slum improvement and of slum eviction and displacement when it was utilized inhumanely. Resistance at this time became more incorporated with popular elites outside of government acting as mediators and resisters to government action. While the poor and rich of Bangalore became increasingly separated, physically and culturally, as the housing scheme and

rehabilitation moved the poor further outside the city, the rich and poor of Mumbai were finding more (relatively speaking) alliances in Mumbai in resisting the government, as they would live in the same building under the SRS scheme and lived in closer proximity on the peninsula. While government representatives in Bangalore negotiated for better resettlement for their constituents, MLAs in Mumbai were joining in residents and NGO-led protests.

These same critical events have transformed these cities in different ways, driving home the point that a place's political culture, history, and space are essential to understanding its social movement. A more anthropological and place-specific approach must be employed for understanding social movements, rather than trying to define social movements in general. This also has implications for future coalition-building efforts for slumdwellers rights in India—that perhaps rather than a unified and singular approach, there should be more of a collaborative toolkit available to activists to choose from and develop further with each critical event. No strategy is necessarily best, but knowledge-sharing on what approaches have worked best in different circumstances and places can aid the move to achieve better livelihood for the urban poor and subaltern across the country.

There were a few important limitations to this study. Firstly, it was conducted entirely from the archive available on the Internet, and entirely from English-language sources. This strategy allowed for me to construct the building blocks of an archival project that can be expanded in the future. Secondly, this project was conducted entirely remotely and without direct access to contemporary actors in Mumbai and Bangalore, but again it provides some evidence-based working theory that would be helpful when entering the field. Thirdly, the only English-language newspaper archive available for the period of time in question, 1975-2000 was Times of India, which is a Mumbai-based paper which naturally covers more Mumbai stories

than Bangalore. Thus, alternative and exterior sources were utilized more in gaining information on Bangalore in order to compensate for what is not covered in the Times of India archive. Beyond that though, as mentioned earlier in the paper, the wider public consciousness around slumdwellers' rights or slum demolitions is just simply not as robust in Bangalore as in Mumbai, thus making the quest for information about these topics in Bangalore from the archive that much more difficult. What is presented is simply the amalgamation of the resources I was able to find.

These limitations translate directly into the next steps and future possibilities of this research. Firstly, this project could be expanded and more robust by use of more sources that may not be available on the internet or from a remote setting (like for example, older archives of The Hindu and The Deccan Herald newspapers). Secondly, physical presence and direct access to these places could aid the project in that the archive could be supplemented with ethnographic work on housing activism as it is today. The contemporary struggles could be connected to what has been found through this analysis of the archive and of history in this way. Additionally, interviews with activists could provide interesting perspectives on their memories of these critical events and of media coverage at the time. Thirdly, this work could be expanded by looking at more critical moments, in between and beyond the time period selected for this paper, to further understand the comparison between Bangalore and Mumbai, including the second World Class City evictions of the early 2000s. While certainly only the first step, this project provides a useful framework by which to advance further inquiry into the question of how and why social movements around housing rights in different places manifest differently, and how this perspective can further aid these movements and the people behind them in the future.

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